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ABSTRACT
THE DETERMINANTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY STRINGENCY 
AND THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON TRADE
Çalışkan, Ahmet
Master of Arts, Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Savaş Alpay 
August 2000
In this thesis, we first focus on the relationship between stringency of 
environmental regulation and some conventional indicators of economic 
development. We argue that this approach measures a more immediate 
relationship than previous studies that have concentrated on the relationship 
between income and emissions of pollutants. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find 
that the relationship between income and environmental policy stringency (EPS) 
is, to some degree, in line with previous findings that suggested an inverted-U 
type relationship between income and emissions, called Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC). We also find that trade liberalization has a positive effect on EPS. 
The second part of our study evaluates the impact of EPS on international 
competitiveness in dirty industries. The analysis is done for three industries and 
only one of them yields evidence for the relocation of dirty industries to 
jurisdictions with lax regulation; the results were inconclusive overall.
Keywords: Environmental Policy Stringency, Environmental Kuznets Curve, 
Pollution Haven Hypothesis
IV
ÖZET
ÇEVRESEL POLİTİKA SIKILIĞI BELİRLEYENLERİ VE ÇEVRE 
POLİTİKASININ TİCARET ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ 
Çalışkan, Ahmet 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Savaş Alpay 
Ağustos, 2000
Bu tezde, öncelikle, çevre politikasının sıkılığı ile, bazı geleneksel 
ekonomik gelişme indikatörleri arasındaki ilişki incelendi. Bizce bu tür bir 
yaklaşım, gelir ile atıkların emisyonlan arasındaki ilişkiye konsantre olan önceki 
çalışmalardan daha öncelikli ve anlamlıdır. Kesitsel bir analiz uygulayarak, gelir- 
çevresel politika sıkılığı (ÇPS) arasındaki ilişkinin, daha önceki araştırmaların 
gelir ile emisyonlar arasında ters-U tipinde bir ilişki (Çevresel Kuznets Eğrisi) 
öneren bulgulan ile bir dereceye kadar uyumlu olduğunu bulduk. Ayrıca, ticaretin 
serbestleştirilmesinin, ÇPS üzerinde pozitif bir etkisi olduğunu saptadık. 
Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü, ÇPS’nın kirli endüstrilerin uluslararası rekabet gücü 
üstündeki etkisini araştırmaktadır. Bu analiz, üç endüstri için yapıldı ve sadece bir 
endüstri için kirli endüstrilerin göçüne dair hipotez desteklendi; bütün olarak 
bakıldığında sonuçlar belirsizdi.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Çevresel Politika Sıkılığı, Çevresel Kuznets Eğrisi, Atık 
Limanı Hipotezi
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Global environmental awareness has emerged since the early 1970's, marked 
by the Stockliolm Conference on Environment and Development in 1972. Especially 
in 1990's, with rapidly emerging concerns about global threats such as ozone-layer 
depletion and global warming, the relation between economic growth and 
environmental degradation has attracted the attention of both policy-makers and 
economists.
1.1 Environmental Performance and Income
Particularly, two lines of thought have enjoyed recent development among 
economists, which are: (i) the relationship between environmental quality and 
economic growth, (ii) trade and the environment. The former relation has been 
empirically modelled through emissions-income relationship by several authors. The 
pioneering study by Grossman and Krueger (1993) has shown an inverted U-type 
relationship between per capita income and emissions of SO2 and suspended 
particulates as a result of a cross-sectional econometric analysis'. The analysis was 
made in order to explore the possible environmental impacts of North American Free 
Trade Agreement. They found that, at initial levels of income, level of emissions 
increases-so environmental quality decreases- until a threshold level of $4000 to 
$5000. After that, emissions begin to decline-and hence environmental quality 
increases-by further economic growth. The EKC hypothesis explained above was 
also verified by others: Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), Shafik (1994), Selden 
and Song (1994), Grossman and Krueger (1995), Cropper and Griffith (1994), have
‘This inverted-U type relationship between income and emissions is called Environmental Kuznets 
Curve Hypothesis, (EKC) in the literature.
made similar tests with alternative indicators of environmental degradation. Shafik 
and Bandyopadhyay (1992) have tested total and annual deforestation, where 
Cropper and Griffith (1994) have tested “rate” o f deforestation. Selden and Song 
(1994) has tested various air pollutants (suspended particulate matter (SPM), SO2, 
NOx and CO) and found similar results; however, they found turning points 
substantially higher than the findings of Grossman and Krueger (1993). Holtz-Eakin 
and Selden (1995) have found that CO2 emissions did not show the same EKC 
pattern. Instead, CO2 emissions monotonically increased with income. Selden and 
Song (1994) brought following explanation related to this result: CO2 has primarily 
global effects rather than local and is more expensive to abate, as opposed to SO2, 
NOx and CO. Hettige et al. (1999) have explored the income-environmental quality 
relation for industrial water pollution. They found that water pollution stabilizes with 
economic development, but did not detect an eventual decline.
A more recent study by Rothman (1998) took a consumption-based approach 
and criticised the previous studies that focused on production in a misleading 
manner. He showed that the worldwide consumption of all goods, especially the ones 
with higher embodied pollution show monotonically increasing functions over time, 
hence casts doubt on the simple EKC hypothesis. In the same study, Rothman 
claimed that the production of pollution-intensive goods was transferred from 
developed to developing countries, and that the level of pollution-intensive 
consumption in developed countries did not decline.
Kaufmann et al. (1998) studied SO2 concentrations as a function of both per 
capita GDP and spatial economic activity, where the latter was defined to be the 
output per unit area. Spatial economic activity itself seemed to reveal an-inverted-U 
type relation with emissions, in the presence of per capita GDP and its square.
A completely different approach to quantifying environmental performance 
was taken by Zaim and Taşkın (1999, 2000). They used an environmental efficiency 
index originally developed by Fare et al. (1989). In this approach, they treat the 
emissions and income as outcomes of a production process. In theory of production, 
taking two alternative assumptions about the disposability of bad outcomes of 
production, they calculated the efficiency indices for a wide set of countries. Then, 
they tested whether these indices show an inverted-U shape with per capita income. 
It turned out that they do, so they verified the EKC hypothesis using a different 
measure of environmental quality.
1.2 Trade and The Environment
This field of study has grown rapidly in terms of both empirical and 
theoretical research. The methodological approaches to trade and environment 
linkage have been summarized by the literature surveys by Dean (1992), Ulph 
(1994), van Beers and van den Bergh (1996) and Alpay (1999). In terms of 
methodology, the published work in the field may be grouped into two broad 
categories. The first group studied the impact of trade liberalization on 
environmental quality, and the second group studied the impact of environmental 
regulations on international competitiveness. As will be explained below in detail, 
trade and environment linkage is not a one-way one.
1.2.1 The Impact of Trade Liberalization on the Environment
This subject has been analyzed by various authors, often in conjunction with 
analyses of growth-environment linkages. Generally, the effect of trade liberalization 
on environment was decomposed into three parts; the scale effect, which represents
the negative effects caused by the growth of the size of the economic activities; the 
technique effect, showing the positive effects caused by innovation and cleaner 
production techniques; and the composition effect, showing the ambiguous effect^ 
generated by the changes in the bundle of goods produced by the economy. While 
explaining the inverted-U cuiwe obtained from income-emissions relation, Grossman 
and Krueger (1993, 1995), Selden and Song (1994) suggested that technique and 
composition effect dominate the scale effect after some threshold level of income. A 
theoretical treatment of these three effects has been done by Antweiler et al. (1998). 
By developing a two-sector model, they distinguished these three effects and 
measured the magnitude of them. According to their model, the pattern of trade was 
determined by the interaction of factor endowment and income differences. They 
found that income gains brought about by further trade or neutral technological 
progress tend to lower pollution, but income gains brought about by capital 
accumulation raise pollution. They combined their theoretical findings with their 
empirical estimates of seale and technique effects, to reach the conclusion: if trade 
liberalization raises GDP per person by 1 %, then pollution concentrations fall by 
about 1 %. So, in case of sulfur dioxide, they found that free trade is good for the 
environment.
Some authors have studied the possible impact of trade liberalization on the 
environmental poliey and regulation performance of the governments. Fredriksson 
and Eliste (1998) have tested whether the environmental policy stringency (EPS)^ 
index is related to the government transfers to the agricultural sector and strategic 
behavior by the producers. They suggest that there is a positive relation between 
government transfers to the agriculture sector and the strictness o f environmental
 ^This effect depends on country characteristics, comparative advantage patterns, see 
Antweiler et al. (1998) on this.
regulations on this sector. They provide this relation as a possible explanation for 
why observed increases in the stringency of environmental regulations have been 
found to have small, insignificant, or even reverse effects on trade patterns.
Fredriksson (1999) assesses the effects of trade liberalization by a pressure 
group model where environmental and industry lobby groups offer political support 
in return for favorable tax policies. He uses this model to find equilibrium pollution 
tax rates. He finds that the level of political conflict falls with trade liberalization. He 
also shows that pollution tax decreases if the lobbying effort by the environmental 
lobby decreases more rapidly than by the industry lobby ceteris paribus.
A country is regarded as engaging in “ecological-dumping”, or “eco- 
dumping” when it gains international competitiveness in a dirty'* industry through 
imposing laxer environmental standards. The existence of eco-dumping was 
supported by Daly (1993), Esty (1994), Dua and Esty (1997), and Esty and Geradin 
(1997). Xu (1999) applied seemingly unrelated regression to a system of sectoral 
share equations derived from a generalised GDP function and showed that 
environmental factor is not a significant determinant of international 
competitiveness, whereas technology is. Hence he concluded that eco-dumping is not 
an effective strategy in this context.
1.2.2 Effect of Environmental Regulations on Competitiveness
Following Alpay (1999) we can talk of a conventional and a revisionist 
school on this subject. Conventional school argues that higher environmental 
standards at home will deteriorate competitiveness of domestic firms, and will
 ^EPS will be explained later
'' Dirty industries are defined to be the industries that unit abatement costs exceed 1 percent of the total 
cost, by Low and Yeats (1992)
relocate highly regulated industries to lax regulation countries. This idea is known as 
“pollution haven hypothesis” and found support from mostly theoretical papers. 
Pethig (1976), Siebert (1977), Yohe (1979), McGuire (1982), Palmer, Oates and 
Portney (1995), Simpson and Bradford (1996). Their main argument is that new 
environmental regulations introduce new constraints in the profit maximization 
problem of the firm, and this implies same or reduced profits for the firm. However, 
this result is not proved empirically. Moreover, many authors conducted the 
empirical tests of the pollution haven hypothesis and they either found no evidence 
of industry relocation, or they could explain this relocation by factors other than 
environmental regulation differences across countries. Studies in this line include: 
Kalt (1988), Tobey (1990), van Beers and van den Bergh (1997). Kalt has made his 
test in a Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade, whereas Tobey has used a 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model. Low (1991) has shown that, pollution abatement and 
control costs constituted 1 to 3 % of total sales and concluded that this was too low 
for industries to relocate to lax regulation jurisdictions, in the presence of stronger 
factors like capital and labor costs. Mani and Wheeler (1999) has shown that 
pollution-intensive output as a percentage of total manufacturing has fallen 
consistently in the OECD countries and risen steadily in less-developed countries 
(LDC’s). However, they did not attribute this result to the pollution haven effects, 
because they also showed that consumption-production ratios for dirty goods 
remained close to unity in the LDC’s during the relevant period. Moreover, they 
found that income elasticity of basic industrial products in the LDC’s is high. By 
using a signalling approach, Bommer (1999) has shown that, relocation may not 
always take place beeause of more lenient standards. Rather, for the producer, it may
be a tool of indirect rent-seeking to convince the policymaker to refrain from a 
further tightening of environmental control.
The revisionist school argues that environmental policy stringency (EPS) 
further improves the competitiveness of domestic firms through triggered innovation. 
This argument was developed by Porter and van der Linde (1995)^ and was severely 
criticized by Palmer et al. (1995). Porter and van der Linde (1995) suggested that 
stricter environmental regulation forces the firms to innovate, and these firms enjoy 
higher productivity and hence higher profits as a result of triggered innovation. The 
criticism of Palmer et al. (1995) was based on the lacking evidence for the Porter 
hypothesis, where Porter and van der Linde (1995) have only provided case studies 
in support of their argument. Theoretically, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) show 
that the trade-off between environmental conditions and profits of the home industry 
remains, but is less sharp because of the downsizing and modernization of the 
industry as a result of stricter environmental policy.
Having introduced the existing literature on the linkages between 
environmental performance-income and trade-environmental performance, we now 
mention a fundamentally different approach to the assessment of environmental 
performance. This approach attempts to quantify the environmental policy 
performance of the governments and it is pioneered by Dasgupta et al. (1995). Their 
methodology is based on a survey instrument that is used to assess the 1992 UNCED 
reports presented by 145 countries* '. Fredriksson and Eliste (1998) have contributed 
to the basic data construction by evaluating the environmental policy stringency 
(EPS) for an additional 32 countries (only for agriculture), after the contribution of 
31 countries by Dasgupta et al. (1995).
 ^Thereafter called “Porter hypothesis”
* The methodology is expiained in Chapter 5
In this study, we first combine these two sets of data and construct the overall 
EPS index for a set of 63 countries. Then, using this data, we conduct empirical 
analyses in order to get answers to three questions: First, what are the conventional 
economic indicators that may be determining EPS? This investigation is closely 
related to the income-environmental quality literature (the EKC hypothesis) that has 
been introduced above. In fact, we argue that this question is more critical and 
deserves more attention than income-emissions relation in the sense that EPS is an 
indicator of the immediate response of the political authority to the environmental 
quality demands of the public. The change in emission concentrations is a secondary 
effect that occurs after income shows its effect on policy changes. We intend to focus 
on the shape and elasticity of EPS with respect to income to see whether strictness of 
regulation is related to income in the way implied by the EKC hypothesis.
Second, what are the implications of trade liberalization for the 
environmental policy performance? We intend to test the effects of various openness 
indicators on EPS. This analysis will constitute a test of the validity of the eco- 
dumping hypothesis. If we find a negative relationship between EPS and openness, 
this will imply that there is a motive for countries to impose laxer environmental 
standards if trade is further liberalised.
Our third question is whether the strictness of environmental regulation 
causes deterioration of comparative advantage in domestic dirty industries? If so, 
relocation of these industries and “pollution havens” would result. We make this 
analysis for three dirty industries; iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and cement. 
Note that, in this part of the analysis, we take strictness of regulation as a source of 
competitiveness effects, hence it is an independent variable.
The organization of the thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2, we investigate the 
economic determinants of the EPS, consisting of both overall economic variables and 
the openness variables. In Chapter 3, we investigate the competitiveness implications 
of the strictness of environmental policy; in Chapter 4 we present our data sources. In 
Chapter 5 we present our results and interpretations thereof, and Chapter 6 
summarizes main findings.
CHAPTER II
ENVIRONM ENTAL POLICY STRINGENCY AND ITS 
DETERMINANTS
Quantifying environmental policy performance has not been given adequate 
attention in the literature. To our knowledge, there are only two studies that shed 
light on this area: Dasgupta et al. (1995) and Fredriksson and Eliste (1998). Dasgupta 
et al. have surveyed 1992 UNCED reports in order to assess environmental policy 
stringency (EPS) for the overall economy, whereas Fredriksson and Eliste have 
evaluated EPS indices for only agriculture sector. Both have used the same 
methodology while constructing the indices^. Thus their indices are comparable. 
Dasgupta et al. have constructed stringency data for 32 countries, and Fredriksson 
and Eliste have done this for another 31 countries, but for only agriculture sector. In 
this chapter, we intend to explore the determinants o f the environmental stringency 
(EPS) of the whole economy. However, the number o f countries used in Dasgupta et 
al. was very limited and thus needs to be extended. So, we extended the 32-country 
overall index of Dasgupta et al. (1995) to 63 countries by using Fredriksson and 
Eliste’s (1998) study. The construction of this data will be explained in Chapter 5.
As wc have pointed out earlier, there is an extensive literature on the relation 
between income and environmental quality. Some studies have only looked at 
pollution-income relationship (EKC hypothesis), some others have employed a larger 
set of explanatory variables along with per capita income, such as spatial economic 
activity, population density, capital-labor ratio, trade intensity, etc* .
’ See Chapter 5 for a discussion o f the methodology.
* See Kaufmann et al. (1998), Selden and Song (1994), Antweiler et al. (1998)
10
Wc think that the effect of these indicators on the performance of 
environmental policy and regulation is at least as important as the effects of them on 
emission concentrations. Following figure will help us see this more clearly;
Wc can say that the primary force from people is the pressure on the political 
authority in quest of higher environmental quality. Most of the empirical studies have 
asked questions regarding the indirect relation between the economic indicators 
(mainly GDP) and emissions. However, we know that emissions are the end-of-pipe 
indicators of environmental quality. They are the households that put pressure on 
governments for them to improve environmental regulations. So, the relation 
between these economic indicators and policy stringency is more relevant and 
deserves more attention. We acknowledge the fact that, up to now, because of the 
lack of data, this analysis could not be done. But now, given the partial data set, we 
ask the question: What arc the determinants of environmental policy stringency?
We have indicated that Dasgupta et al. (1995) have focused on some 
institutional measures of socioeconomic development-like "freedom of property"-, 
together with real variables. Fredriksson and Eliste (1998) have used some real 
economic indicators like trade intensity and agriculture share of GDP and they have 
found that these indicators were relevant. In this study, we intend to take a mixed
11
approach, where we include both institutional and real economic variables for they 
may both be associated with EPS.
A separate set of possible determinants of EPS includes the variables related 
to trade liberalization. We wanted to investigate the effects of trade liberalization on 
EPS, especially because of the extensive literature about the possible environmental 
effects of the international free trade agreements.
2.1 Economy-wide Variables
The fust variable that we expect to influence EPS is the per capita income. 
This variable seems to be the most widely used indicator of economic development 
in relation to environmental quality. Grossman and Krueger (1993, 1995), Selden 
and Song (1994), Shafik and Bandyoypadhyay(1992) have used it in relation to 
emissions, Dasgupta(1995) et al. and Fredriksson and Eliste (1998) in relation to 
policy stringency. The importance of income comes from the idea that, 
environmental quality is a normal good; so, richer people will exert more pressure on 
the political authority for better environmental policy, consequently better 
environmental quality. However, we expect that at initial levels of income, income 
elasticity of stringency may be low due to the fact that poorer people are more 
interested in satisfying their basic needs rather than protecting natural resources. 
Since this information will be valuable when we will try to compare our results with 
the EKC hypothesis, we intend to calculate income elasticity of stringency at 
subsequent intervals of income. Moreover, we will try to find the functional form 
that best fits the income-stringency relationship.
Second variable that we expect to have considerable political impact on 
governments for better policy performance is the intensity of economic activity. We
12
measure this variable by GDP per km . We know that every economic activity causes 
some harms in some way to the environment. We normalize by the area since the 
pressure from people will increase if the economic activity is more concentrated. 
This variable was called “spatial economic activity” and was used as an independent 
variable by Kaufmann et al. (1998). We expect that it will have a positive effect on 
stringency. Wc also intend to include the square of this variable, in order to observe 
whether it has differential effects at different income levels. In fact, we expect that it 
should. This conjecture is based on the fact that as countries reach a certain level of 
industrialization, the composition of overall output changes in favor of service 
industries rather than manufacturing industries. Given that services are 
environmentally cleaner than manufacturing, a higher service portion of GDP implies 
a less marginal pollution effect of a marginal GDP per area. Consequently, a weaker 
effect on the environment will thrust a weaker upward stress on stringency of 
regulation. Hence, we expect that the sign of the quadratic term will be negative, but 
do not know whether it will be significant or not. If a significant quadratic tenn 
comes out, this will be some support for the EKC hypothesis, implying a fall in EPS 
due to a cleaner environment after some threshold development level. These affluent 
economies liave by themselves begun to weaken emphasis on manufacturing 
industries, especially dirty ones' .^ Hence, they do not need to increase stringency of 
regulations at the previous high elasticity. This is a possible explanation for the 
negative quadratic term of both GDP per capita and spatial economic activity. This is 
consistent with and can be explained by a shift of preferences of the individual 
economies as a whole. They gradually value the environment more than they value 
economic growth, hence find ways to get wealthier without hanning the earth. Since
’ Dirty industries are defined to be the industries that unit abatement costs exceed 1 percent of the 
total production cost, by Low and Yeats (1992)
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environmental valuation and awareness is not that strong in developing economies, 
they still have to fight with pollution via lobbying activities.
Wc acknowledge that we cannot capture the compositional effects of 
economic activity by employing the variables GDP per capita and GDP per area. 
There are many countries in the World that relies upon resource industries, or in 
which a significant portion of the total output is from service industries. These 
industries yield quite large amount of income, but do not generally require high 
levels of capital, and generally do not pollute much (See Antweiler et al. (1998)). To 
get rid of the differences in the embodied capital in total income, we will use capital- 
labor ratio, measured by the accumulated capital investment per worker, (KAPW) as 
an explanatory variable for EPS.
Antw eiler et al. (1998) provide empirical evidence that more capital intensive 
industries arc more polluting industries. Given this information, we expect that 
capital intensity variable will have a positive effect on EPS.
This variable is not only important only for its implications for the structure 
of an economy. It also has a strong interaction with trade liberalization. Factor 
endowment hypothesis states that a country exports the good that embodies a higher 
percentage of the factor that is abundant in that country. Capital and labor are the 
most widely used factors of production in an economy. Capital-labor ratio and 
indicators oi‘ opcnness-which will be explained later- arc crucial variables in the 
sense that further openness together with factor endowment considerations have 
important effects on international trade.
We intend to include the urban ratio of the total population, URB, as an 
explanatory variable in our regressions. As we know, industrialization process
14
involves ever increasing population in cities. If we look at the history of the modern 
environmental movement beginning with the early 70s, we observe that the political 
pressure from environmental interest groups has been improved by the rising urban 
population in many developed and developing countries. The possible association of 
urban population ratio with EPS has two different sources. First, more crowded cities 
made cleaning of air, water and land more important. This is especially true for local 
pollutants that have immediate effects. The increasing threat of pollutants have come 
from both accommodation and manufacturing activities around cities. Secondly, 
“environmental consciousness” has been improved by the process of urbanization. 
The mechanism of this increasing awareness was through the help of mass media. 
Mass media has been a strong instrument of environmental interest groups. They 
have effectively used it on government and on industry representatives. The strength 
of the mass media comes, of course, from the highly organized, highly educated city 
population. We predict that both dimensions of urbanization have positive relation 
with EPS.
2.2 Effects of Trade Liberalization on Stringency
Environmental implications of trade liberalization have been analyzed 
extensively during 1990s, especially because of the influential free trade agreements 
such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round. 
There is a growing literature on both theoretical and empirical approaches to possible 
implications of freer global trade on the resources of individual countries and the 
world. Up to date, the focus of the research has been on the implications of freer 
trade on the emissions of various pollutants, such as SO2 and CO2. Many theoretical
15
papers on the issue suggested that environmental policy differences across countries 
together with higher capital mobility drove pollution intensive industries to the 
countries with lax regulation. This hypothesis is called the “pollution haven 
hypothesis” and has been defended by some theoretical papers'®. However, 
Grossman and Krueger (1993), Tobey (1990), Jaffe et al. (1995) empirically tested 
this hypothesis and detected no significant effect of policy differences on trade flows. 
Since this hypothesis is related to the consequences o f EPS rather than its causes, we 
will analyze this issue in detail in Chapter 3. Our focus here is the effect of openness 
itself on the EPS. We argue that openness to international markets, or the absence 
thereof, may have effects on the level of ES in a country.
Now, let us try to explain why openness should be effective on the EPS. In 
this respect, first argument is based on export markets. We know that, less-developed 
countries (LDCs) chiefly export to developed, high-income countries, where high- 
income countries themselves chiefly export to again high-income countries. The 
exporting LDCs must meet the stricter environmental standards of high-income 
importing countries (or groups of countries like European Union). For this purpose, 
exporting firms of the LDCs must shift to cleaner production processes. Given the 
assumption that exporter firms are also, in general, biggest producers in those LDCs, 
these shifts to cleaner processes reduces the negative pressure from producer lobbies 
on the EPS. This makes the tightening of the environmental standards easier for the 
policymakers. For developed economies, they chiefly export to other developed 
economies and there is no impact on production techniques induced by exports. For 
the portion of their exports to LDCs, the environmental standards o f their own will
10See Chapter 1 for examples.
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prevent them from exporting dirtier products to LDCs. Hence the overall effect of 
further trade liberalization on the EPS should be positive".
A second argument in favor of the suggested positive impact is as follows. 
Currently, there are global pressures on exporting countries for the ratification of 
international environmental agreements. Some agreements ban imports from non- 
signatories*^. This pressure will exert positive thrust on ES of exporters as a whole.
A counter-argument to the above scenarios has been suggested by a number 
of scholars; this is known as “eco-dumping hypothesis”. This hypothesis suggests 
that competitiveness in international markets will force governments to relax their ES 
in the hope of gaining competitive advantage through lowering costs. However, 
many empirical studies in the literature show that abatement costs are a small 
percentage (1 to 3) of the total costs of production (Low (1991)), so they may not 
have real effects on competitiveness. We will test whether increased competition in 
the world market in the form of further trade liberalization has a negative effect on 
EPS.
Various indicators of openness to international markets have been suggested 
by several authors. The most widely used one is the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GDP (called as trade intensity, OPl). We too, intend to use this variable 
while testing the impact of openness on EPS. Since there may be some information 
that we cannot capture by trade intensity, we have to use other indicators of 
openness. We intend to adopt the following indicators suggested by Sachs and 
Warner (1995);
1. Black market premium in foreign exchange markets over 1980s (BMP).
" For more on tins discussion, see Birdsall and Wlieeler (1992)
Case of Korea can be found at: htlp://ci.mond.org/9615/961519.html
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2. Average level o f tariffs on imports over 1985-1988 (TAR). It is the own-import 
weighted average tariff rate on capital goods and intermediates.
3. Coverage of quotas on total imports during 1985-1988 (QUO). It is the own- 
import weighted non-tariff frequency on capital goods and intermediates.
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CHAPTER III
STRINGENCY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: POLLUTION  
HAVEN HYPOTHESES RECONSIDERED
In this chapter, we intend to inquire into the possible consequences of EPS on 
the economies. The analysis made here evaluates the effects of EPS on the 
comparative advantage of “dirty” ^^  industries of the economies. This analysis will 
yield valuable results in the assessment of the “pollution haven hypothesis”, which 
suggests that dirty industries will migrate to the countries with laxer regulation.
3.1 Comparative Advantage Approach
Here, we intend to measure the effects of the ES on the comparative 
advantages of the respective countries. The first step here is to find an indicator of 
comparative advantage of a specific country for a specific industry. For this purpose, 
we adopted the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) devised by Balassa 
(1965,1979) and used by Low and Yeats (1992). RCAij of a specific country i for 
good j is the ratio of the share of exports of good j of country i in its total exports, to 
the share of world exports of good j in the world total exports. If this ratio is greater 
than unity, this is generally interpreted to mean that the country is at a comparative 
advantage in the trade of the product, since the industry’s share in the country’s 
exports exceeds its share in world trade. This seems to be a relevant measure of the 
competitiveness in an industry of a specific country. It is also comparable in the 
sense that it uses standard criteria for measurement. We intend to use the following
See Chapter 1
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model to measure the possible impact of the EPS on the competitiveness of the 
countries in a specific industry j:
DRCAij = c(l) + c(2)*EPSi i = 1,..,63 countries (1)
In the above equation, DRCAij represents the difference in the RCA of 
country i in industry] between 1982 and 1992'"*. This model tests the hypothesis that, 
whether competitiveness of industry j has decreased between 1982 and 1992 for the 
countries with a higher EPS. A negative coefficient on EPS will imply the 
verification of the above hypothesis. Assuming that investment decisions are based 
on comparative advantage and capital is mobile enough across countries, above 
result will constitute some empirical support for the “pollution haven hypothesis” .
One should recognize the assumption in the above model that EPSj is 
constant during the relevant period. In fact, rather than its constancy, we need to only 
rule out changes in EPS that are not proportionate across countries. If all the 
countries have increased their EPS by the same percentage, this will not change the 
relative stringency of each country with respect to all others. So, there will not be an 
incentive for an industry to relocate to another country. For the purpose of analysis, 
we have to make this assumption, since we want to obtain the sign and the magnitude 
of differences in competitiveness of an industry in different countries while holding 
their policy strictness constant. We consider that ten years is short enough for 
constancy o f the EPS, but long enough for dislocation of industries to more 
profitable areas. The following are our justifications for these assumptions:
We can say that investment decisions made by firms are much more dynamic 
than legislation and enforcement of government regulations. Red-tape in 
bureaucracy, political controversies, industry lobby activities always make
''' Tlie selection of 1992 is due to the fact tliat EPS data was constructed from UNCED 1992 reports. 
The selection of ten years will be c.\plaincd.
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environmental regulations hard and time-consuming to enforce and implement. 
Environmental awareness does not develop in a matter of ten years, yet only 
developing it does not guarantee reforms in environmental policy.
As expressed earlier, a negative and significant coefficient on EPS will imply 
that more stringent economies have had a deteriorating weight in dirty industries. A 
positive and significant coefficient, on the other hand, will imply two possible 
results:
1. The widely accepted anti-thesis of pollution haven is the factor- 
endowment hypothesis. It suggests that a country exports the goods that embody a 
higher percentage of the factor that it abundantly has. We know that capital and labor 
are the most widely accepted factors of production and industrialized, high-income 
countries are endowed with more capital and low-income countries with more labor. 
We also know that capital-intensive industries are generally dirtier (Antweiler et al., 
1998). So, the hypothesis suggests that further trade will induce high-income, high- 
EPS*^ economies to specialize in capital-intensive, dirtier industries. So, a positive 
coefficient will imply that factor-endowment hypothesis is dominant in determining 
comparative advantage patterns.
2. The second explanation to an improving competitiveness emerges as 
possible empirical evidence to the “Porter hypothesis” . Porter, in a theoretical paper, 
has shown that, in some cases, stricter environmental regulation at home increases 
competitiveness of domestic firms through innovation. The mechanism is as follows: 
Tough environmental regulation in the form of economic incentives can trigger 
innovation that increases a firm’s competitiveness in the long-run, which would not
15 Tlie point Uiat liigh-income economies have also high ES values was established by Dasgupta el al. 
and Fredriksson and Eliste, as explained in Cliapter 1
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be the case without the regulation. Eventually, this effect may outweigh the short-run 
costs of the regulation (Porter and van der Linde (1995)).
In case a positive relation comes out of the regression of eqn.(2), we have to 
assess whether this result comes from a factor-endowment basis, or from the 
innovation suggested by Porter, or from both. To test the possible influence of 
capital-labor ratio (KAPW) on the comparative advantage of dirty industries, we can 
devise the following model:
DRCAij = c(l) + c(2)*DKAPWi (2)
In the above equation, DRCAy represents the difference in the RCA of 
country i in industry) between 1982 and 1992 as explained before, and DKAPWj 
represents the percentage change in the KAPW of country i between 1982 and 1992. 
In this model, we are attempting to measure the influence of the changes in the 
“capital abundance” on the changes in the RCA. This is exactly a test of factor 
endowment hypothesis for dirty industries, remembering that dirty industries are 
also capital intensive. We expect a positive relationship under the validity of the 
factor endowment hypothesis. Given that we have only two alternative explanations 
for a positive relationship in (2), an insignificant coefficient from (3) should imply 
that the positive thrust on competitiveness comes from innovation and productivity 
changes of the firms in economies with stricter-regulation, and not from an increased 
relative capital abundance.
A significant positive coefficient on KAPW difference will lead us to a 
verification o f the factor-endowment hypothesis. However, this will confiase us about 
a possible “Porter” effect. A further influence on comparative advantage of 
innovation and productivity may or may not exist. Since we do not have detailed data 
on the technological superiority of some economies over others, (of course, we must
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have quantified data for a very wide set of countries for this purpose) we cannot 
empirically assess the Porter effect in this analysis.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND ESTIMATION
4.1 Environmental Policy Stringency Index
The most important information that constitutes the core of our analysis is the 
environmental policy stringency (EPS) index for a wide set of countries. As we have 
expressed earlier, we developed this data from the studies of Dasgupta et al. (1995) 
and Fredriksson and Eliste (1998). Fredriksson and Eliste have adopted the 
methodology of Dasgupta et al. (1995). While constructing the data, Dasgupta et al. 
(1995) surveyed the reports presented by a large number of countries to the UNCED 
1992. Since the reports were prepared according to a standard reporting format 
imposed by UN, they were comparable across countries. Dasgupta et al. used a 
multidimensional survey that assesses the state of;
"(i) environmental awareness; (ii) scope of policies adopted; (iii) scope of legislation 
enacted; (iv) control mechanisms in place; and (v) the degree of success in 
implementation"'^
Twenty-five survey questions are assessed in a 4x5 matrix, and one of 0, 1,2 
values are entered for each entry, where these values indicate low, medium and high 
performance, respectively. The matrix consists of the four environmental aspects: 
Air, Water, Land and Living Resources. On the other dimension, there are five 
activity sectors; Agriculture, Industry, Energy, Transport and the Urban sector. Then 
by summing up all the 500 entries for each country, overall index is obtained.
For the purposes of our analysis, we extended the 32 countries of Dasgupta et 
al. to a larger set for a more healthy statistical analysis. Also, the above set of
16 Tlie survey instrument is available in Dasgupta et al. (1995) paper.
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countries was mostly consisting of low-income countries and did not include many 
countries that belong to high-income group. At this point, we recognized that the 
relation between agricultural and overall indices is quite strong.
Figure 2
Note: EPSDAS and AGRDAS stand for tire EPS indices of Dasgupta ct al. (1995) for agriculture 
sector and overall sector, respectively.
Table 1
Note: EPSDAS and AGRDAS stand for tlie EPS indices of Dasgupta et al. (1995) for agriculture 
sector and overall sector, respectively.
Included observations: 32
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
EPSD AS=C( 1 )+C(2)* AGRDAS
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C(l) 51.89328 21.81992 2.378252 0.0240
C(2) 4.983269 0.170076 29.30021 0.0000
R-squared 0.937751 Mean dependent var 541.3438
Adjusted R-squared 0.935676 S.D. dependent var 199.6584
S.E. of regression 50.63758 Akaike info criterion 7.909849
Sum squared resid 76924.94 Schwarz criterion 8.001458
Log likelihood -169.9636 F-statistic 451.9376
Durbin-Watson stat 1.265256 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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As it can be observed from the graph and OLS regression results above, the 
interaction between agriculture index and overall index is quite significant and no 
outliars are observed. Note that the coefficient of 4.98 quite reflects the five activity 
sectors. Given that we also had the stringency values for agricultural sector for 
another 31 countries from Fredriksson and Eliste (1998), we could estimate the 
overall environmental policy stringency (EPS) values for this second set of countries 
from the linear equation we obtained above. So, we were able to extend Dasgupta et 
al. Data set to 63 countries through this estimation*’ .
4.2 Other Data
The next set of data we required was the output data. GDP per capita 
expressed in 1985 international prices (Chain Index) was obtained from Penn World 
Tables (PWT). The collection and estimation of the PWT data is described in 
Summers and Heston (1991)**. To get rid of temporary fluctuations in the income, 
we took three-year averages (1990, 1991 and 1992). The other data obtained from 
this source includes population, trade intensity, and capital stock per worker. Trade 
intensity is calculated as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to total GDP. 
Capital stock per worker (KAPW) was calculated as the cumulative, depreciated sum 
of past gross domestic investment in producers durables, nonresidential construction, 
and other construction. KAPW data was missing for 20 countries of our set of 63 
countries. We estimated this data from the "World Tables 1992"*^. We took the 
values of the Gross Domestic Investment expressed as percentage of GDP for the 
1981-1990 period. Then we accumulated the investment values and depreciated with
’’ Tlie stream of EPS values for 63 countries and otlier data are available in Table Al in Appendix. 
The PWT data are available in revision 5.6 from Uie NBER ftp site at ftp://ftp.nber.org/pwt56/
19 See references
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20% annual rate of depreciation. We picked the 20% rate as an average that we 
estimated from the method applied by the PWT, where they used differential rates 
for machines, construction equipment, etc.
To calculate the GDP per area variable, we obtained the necessary area data 
from A.S. Banks' "Political Handbook of the World 1998". The urbanisation data 
was obtained from Table 31 of "World Resources 1992-93" published by World 
Resources Institute. For missing countries in World Resources, we resorted to World 
Development Indicators 2000, published by the World Bank^°.
The openness indicators other than trade intensity were taken from Sachs and 
Warner (1995).
For the comparative advantage analysis conducted in this study, we obtained 
the export data from 1985 and 1993 issues of the “International Trade Statistics 
Yearbook” published by the United Nations. These sources give exports of each 
country by the three-digit SITC commodity code. The 1985 and 1993 yearbooks also 
included data of 1982 and 1992 that we used for our analysis.
Tills source can be accessed tlnough tlie website: 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/databytopic.html
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CHAPTER V
M ETHODOLOGY, RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
5.1 Results for Determinants of Stringency
Our search for the determinants of environmental stringency includes the test 
of many explanatory variables, which are defined below:
EPS is the environmental stringency index,
GDPPC is the GDP per capita, and GDPPCS is the square of it,
GDPPA is the GDP per area, and GDPPAS is the square of it,
KAPW is the capital labor ratio,
URB is the urbanization rate.
OPl is the trade intensity, (exports+imports)/gdp,
BMP is the black market premium in foreign exchange markets (can also be 
viewed as an indicator of financial liberalization);
TAR is the tariff coverage for imports,
QUO is the quota coverage
As it was explained before, the first seven variables are economy-wide 
variables and the last four variables measure the openness of a country. When we 
analyzed the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables of the above variables, 
we observed that GDP per capita variable is highly correlated with the capital per 
worker (KAPW)^*. To avoid the multicollinearity problem, we decided to drop the 
KAPW from our model.
The BMP variable will be included as a dummy variable in our model so that 
the value 1 indicates there is no positive or negative premium in foreign exchange
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markets and 0 otherwise. The dummy will be denoted D l. This implies that the 
countries with D l= l are financially liberalized.
One of our aims about the development-EPS relationship is the analysis of 
the relation at different income ranges. For the purpose o f specifying the relevant 
categories o f income, we decided to look at the following graph that shows the 
relation of per capita income with EPS;
While we are making the classification, we took several criteria into 
consideration. First, we were careful to make an even distribution of points to each 
category. Second, when we analyzed the above figure, we realized that we could talk 
of three different slopes of income-EPS relation for three income groups. It appears 
that until like $2000, the slope seems quite high. After 2000, slope seems to be 
lower for the middle-income group, which we may categorize as until, like $8000. 
After $8000, it seems that the variation in the high-income group decreases. That
Tlie correlation matrix is presented in Table A2 in Appendix.
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implies a convergence among these countries. The groups that we suggest are as the 
following;
Income
Poor
Middle-income
High-income
$0-$2000
$2000-58000
$8000-
To see whether the behavior of the intercept and slope of the income-EPS is 
significantly different in these groups, we intend to include two dummies, D2 and D3 
and two variables GDPPC*D2 and GDPPC*D3, respectively. D2 is designed such 
that the value 1 is entered if the country is poor and 0 otherwise. D3 is designed such 
that 1 is entered if the country is middle-income and 0 otherwise.
In our initial regressions where we included all the variables listed at the 
beginning of the section as explanatory variables, the followings were observed: The 
variables GDPPCS, GDPPA, GDPPAS, URB, TAR, QUO appeared to be 
insignificant. Given this information, we suggest our model:
EPS = C(l) + C(2)*GDPPC + C(3)*OPl + C(4)*D1 + C(5)*D2 + C(6)*D3
+ C(7)*GDPPC*D2 + C(8)*GDPPC*D3 (3)
The results of the OLS regression are below;
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T a b l e  2
Included observations: 51
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
GDPPC 0.020328 0.005979 3.399804 0.0014
OPl 0.673604 0.289538 2.326475 0.0247
D1 563.9357 88.38368 6.380541 0.0000
D2 270.4018 38.78760 6.971345 0.0000
D3 278.0646 38.18439 7.282155 0.0000
GDPPC*D2 0.082801 0.031541 2.625170 0.0119
GDPPC*D3 0.026877 0.009329 2.881083 0.0061
R-squared 0.950312 Mean dependent var 623.3333
Adjusted R-squared 0.943536 S.D. dependent var 221.0263
S.E. o f regression 52.52051 Akaike info criterion 8.049281
Sum squared resid 121369.8 Schwarz criterion 8.314434
Log likelihood -270.6225 F-statistic 140.2539
Durbin-Watson stat 1.897653 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
While we are dealing with cross-sectional data, the first thing that we fear of 
is the heteroskedasticity problem. To get rid of this problem, we tried "White's 
correction for heteroskedasticity" while doing regressions, which is available in the 
Eviews package. White has derived a heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
for calculating standard errors and t-statisties. (See Halbert White "A 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for 
Heteroskedasticity", Econometrica 48, 1980). The White covariance matrix is given 
by;
T
T - k
{X'Xr\Y^u,^x,x'){X'Xr
/=1
(4)
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where T is the number of observations, k is the number of regressors, and ut 
is the least squares residual. When we conducted the same regression using the above 
correction tool, we observed very close results to the presented results. So we 
concluded that the problem of heteroskedasticity is not present in our case and kept 
the original results above.
The first result from the results is that the per capita income has a strong and 
positive impact on EPS. This result verifies the findings of Dasgupta et al. (1992) 
and of Fredriksson and Eliste (1998). As expected, as people gets richer, they 
demand better envirpnmental regulation. Secondly, the trade intensity (OPl) variable 
and financial liberalization dummy (D l) has a strong and positive effect on EPS. 
This implies that more openness leads to a better environmental policy performance. 
This result is a clear rejection of the eco-dumping hypothesis that claimed a "race to 
the bottom" as a result of freer trade. Thirdly, our classification o f countries on 
income basis and the designated intervals seem to be relevant, evidenced by the 
significant coefficients for both the intercept and the slope variables. This implies 
that the designated income groups show significantly different characteristics in the 
three groups in terms of income-EPS relationship. The slopes for these groups are 
given below:
Slope
Poor 0.103
Middle-income 0.047
High-income 0.020
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Looking at the slopes above, we can talk of a "convergence" in the high- 
income group in the sense that the variation in terms of EPS within this group is low 
compared to other groups. The sensitivity of EPS to income among the middle and 
especially low- income group is high. This implies that there is a significant potential 
for better environmental policy performance within the poor and middle-income 
group. If  we take the positive strong effect of trade liberalization and financial 
liberalization into consideration, we may expect that many countries in low and 
middle-income groups will experience improvements in terms of policy 
performance.
Our second result that openness is good for environmental policy 
performance is also supported by Antweiler et al. (1998). This result can be based on 
following arguments:
a) As a result of the shift of production processes of the LDCs to cleaner 
ones in order to meet higher environmental standards of the importer 
high-income countries, enhancement of policy performance becomes 
easier for LDCs.
b) The international environmental agreements seem to have a real positive 
effect on world-wide policy performance. Especially, practices like 
blocking exports from non-ratifying exporters proves to have a detectable 
effect on ES.
c) Openness seem to increase the awareness on global environmental 
matters.
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5.2 Impact of Stringency on Competitiveness
To be able to obtain results from our differential revealed comparative 
advantage model expressed in Chapter 2 (eqn. 2), we need to choose some dirty 
industries. Low and Yeats (1992) listed forty three-digit SITC code industries as 
dirty industries. These were the industries that incurred pollution abatement and 
control expenditures of greater than or equal to 1 per cent of their total sales in 1988 
in US. They include all three-digit products in SITC 67, SITC 68, and SITC 69 and 
fourteen other three-digit industries from different classes. We picked three 
industries from the list; ferrous metals (SITC 67), non-ferrous metals (SITC 68), and 
cement (SITC 661). We calculated RCA values for each country and for the years 
1982 and 1992. We took the difference and scaled DRCA by multiplying it by 1000, 
while doing regressions'. The results for the three industries are given below:
Tlie DRCA values are available in Appendix A3.
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Ferrous metals ('iron and steeH STTC 67 
Table 3
Note: The data point for Dominican Republic was an outlier, so was dropped from data set.
Included observations: 59
Excluded observations: 4 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
DRCA67=C(1)+C(2)*EPS
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C (l) 999.9195 344.3194 2.904046 0.0052
C(2) -1.008972 0.453893 -2.222928 0.0302
R-squared 0.051409 Mean dependent var 374.2712
Adjusted R-squared 0.034767 S.D.dependent var 914.5937
S.E. of regression 898.5543 Akaike info criterion 13.63488
Sum squared resid 46021790 Schwarz criterion 13.70531
Log likelihood -483.9465 F-statistic 3.089101
Durbin-Watson stat 1.411550 Prob(F-statistic) 0.084188
EPS
Figure 4
Note: Tlie data point for Dominican Republic was an outlier, so was dropped from data set.
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Non-ferrous metals. SITC 68
Table 4
Note: Since Ghana and Chile showed as outliers, we dropped tlieir data points.
Included observations: 56
Excluded observations: 7 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
DRCA68=C(1)+C(2)*EPS
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C (l) 341.8829 294.1927 1.162105 0.2503
C(2) -0.493072 0.343501 -1.435430 0.1569
R-squared 0.022289 Mean dependent var 31.69643
Adjusted R-squared 0.004183 S.D. dependent var 682.9430
S.E. of regression 681.5130 Akaike info criterion 13.08369
Sum squared resid 25080840 Schwarz criterion 13.15603
Log likelihood -443.8039 F-statistic 1.231052
Durbin-Watson stat 2.210671 Prob(F-statistic) 0.272119
EPS
Figure 5
Note: Since Ghana and Chile showed as outliers, we dropped tlieir data points.
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Cement. SITC 661 
Table 5
Included observations: 58
Excluded observations: 5 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
DRC A661 =C( 1 )+C(2)*EPS
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C (l) -934.2082 1195.092 -0.781704 0.4377
C(2) 0.661826 1.451629 0.455919 0.6502
R-squared 0.001699 Mean dependent var -521.1034
Adjusted R-squared -0.016128 S.D. dependent var 3289.214
S.E. of regression 3315.632 Akaike info criterion 16.24668
Sum squared resid 6.16E+08 Schwarz criterion 16.31773
Log likelihood -551.4522 F-statistic 0.095299
Durbin-Watson stat 2.270605 Prob(F-statistic) 0.758691
According to the above results, countries of higher ES seem to lose 
competitiveness in ferrous metals industry. This deterioration of competitiveness is 
implied to exist at 3 per cent significance level. This result implies that this industry
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has escaped from strict-regulation to lax-regulation countries during 1982-1992 
period, supporting the pollution haven hypothesis. However, tests with other two 
industries do not support the same pattern. Statistically, these tests did not yield a 
significant result, with very low probabilities to reject null hypothesis of no relation. 
Despite being insignificant, the last two tests yielded positive coefficients, hence 
created doubt about the result obtained in the ferrous metals industry. Another point 
that leads us to inconclusiveness is the very low R-squared values from all three 
tests. At best, we can say that for some industries, strict-regulation countries may 
have lost competitiveness during the relevant period^^.
22 Here, one should bear in mind tlie assumption of constant relative EPS during tlie relevant period.
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CH A PTER  VI 
CO NCLUSIO N
In this study, we investigated three topics. The first was to explore the 
relationship of the strictness of environmental regulation (EPS) to the more 
conventional indicators of development like per capita income, spatial economic 
activity, capital-labor ratio and urbanization rate. Our approach in this study was 
novel in the sense that we explore the impact of these variables on the environmental 
policy performance, which is a more immediate impact than their impact on the 
emissions. The results showed that per capita income has a very strong and positive 
relation with EPS. Per capita income seemed to embody all the information that is 
inherent in the other explanatory variables. This result verified the results of 
Dasgupta et al. (1995) and Fredriksson and Eliste (1998). In addition to these 
findings, we classified countries on an income basis and found that different income 
groups show significantly different characteristics in the income-EPS relationship. 
According to our classification, the $0-$2000 low-income group seemed to have a 
higher potential in terms of EPS improvement. The middle-income group seemed to 
have a lower response of EPS for a marginal increase in income, relative to low- 
income countries. Lastly, high-income countries seemed to be concentrated within 
the group. This implies that we observe a pattern of "convergence". While we 
increase income per capita, the variability of EPS within the respective group 
decreases.
The second part of the analysis was to assess the effects of trade liberalization 
on environmental policy performance. Positive significant effects of both trade 
intensity variable and the financial liberalization dummy on EPS were found. So, the 
eco-dumping hypothesis that countries impose laxer environmental standards in the
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hope of gaining comparative advantage is not supported by our study. If this 
hypothesis was real, we should have detected a negative impact of openness on EPS. 
As Antweiler et al. (1998) puts it: "Trade appears to be good for the environment".
The third part of our study included a test of the pollution haven hypothesis 
for a selected set of three industries classified as “dirty” by Low (1991). We detected 
a shift o f comparative advantage to laxer-regulation jurisdictions for the iron and 
steel industry. However, this single result was not enough to derive conclusions for 
the pollution haven hypothesis, since the other two industries did not show the same 
negative relation.
Determination of the indicators of the environmental policy stringency 
deserves careful investigation. We tried to contribute to this subject in our study. 
However, currently, we only have data for a single year and this handicaps us when 
we want to make analyses of various kinds. Current possibilities of research in the 
area of environmental quality and its linkages with income and trade will be 
substantially richer if we can construct more time series and cross-sectional data for 
environmental policy stringency.
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Main data
EPS GDPPC GDPPA KAPW URB OP1 BMP TAR QUO
1 SWITZERLAND 947 16212 2710965 76733 63 70.10 0.00 0.012 0.176
2 FINLAND 894 12907 193293 47498 60 48.51 0.00 0.059 0.067
3 GERMANY 951 14694 2680010 41115 86 59.78 0.00 0.039 0.119
4 NETHERLANDS 900 13169 5889883 34084 89 102.53 0.00 0.04 0.126
5 IRELAND 871 9435 476160 22171 58 115.48 0.00 0.019 0.054
6 KOREA 686 7276 3204649 20990 74 63.04 0.09 0.137 0.1
7 TRINIDAD 564 8000 1975039 20772.131 66 76.59 0.45 0.293 0.245
8 BRAZIL 493 3977 71953 12305.386 77 14.75 0.36 0.159 0.047
9 SAFRICA 619 3167 103141 8073.1933 50 45.22 0.11 NA NA
10 BULGARIA 750 5555 425971 17791.011 69 103.91 NA NA NA
11 JAMAICA 633 2471 519118 3471 54 118.33 0.56 0.106 0.105
12 TUNISIA 589 2973 152966 11167.49 57 83.90 0.70 0.218 0.543
13 THAILAND 449 3759 424109 5853 23 76.77 -0.01 0.294 0.055
14 JORDAN 474 2811 111708 11579.261 69 126.66 0.02 0.187 0.109
15 PARAGUAY 443 2151 23898 1011 49 63.58 0.68 0.463 0.013
16 PAPUANG 329 1518 13332 3962.1937 28 93.83 0.27 0.106 0.002
17 PHILIPPINES 447 1717 367776 3598 44 61.97 0.11 0.221 0.467
18 EGYPT 441 1898 103631 8017.1701 44 68.12 0.36 0.104 0.247
19 ZAMBIA 439 688 7833 1353 42 61.76 0.53 0.183 0
20 GHANA 464 924 61157 1341.2644 35 40.57 14.01 0.33 0.2
21 PAKISTAN 508 1407 208265 4139.6113 33 37.37 0.35 0.411 0.075
22 CHINA 529 1398 169874 4218.4313 27 29.06 NA 0.254 0.291
23 KENYA 463 909 40047 822 25 56.34 0.21 0.275 0.203
24 INDIA 507 1266 340449 1997 26 19.87 0.15 1.319 0.888
25 NIGERIA 400 1004 110859 735 37 67.94 0.91 0.447 0.016
26 BANGLADESH 366 1458 1154258 2926.6829 18 26.26 0.81 0.409 0.497
27 MALAWI 352 521 39826 426 12 59.63 0.84 0.121 0.808
28 BHUTAN 256 672 22619 1931.8911 6 62.54 NA NA NA
29 ETHIOPIA 218 312 14758 450.27048 13 35.09 0.54 0.2 0.174
30 TANZANIA 341 551 13824 954.35853 22 45.84 2.24 0.172 0.284
31 MOZAMBIQUE 378 738 15201 2002.2063 30 101.91 1.88 0.106 0
32 Argentina 450 4630 55172 10843 87 16.31 0.34 0.294 0.055
33 Australia 864 14386 32739 38729 85 35.83 0.00 NA NA
34 Austria 894 12833 1206427 36641 59 78.77 0.00 0.047 0.021
35 Belgium 859 13375 4400911 39416 96 141.41 0.00 0.036 0.112
36 Canada 903 16634 45761 44970 78 51.89 0.00 0.046 0.019
37 Chile 510 4566 82031 11306 85 62.46 0.19 0.213 0.098
38 Colombia 470 3326 97536 12742 71 35.14 0.05 0.31 0.52
39 Czech 622 4131 820396 15502.222 75 67.85 NA NA NA
40 Denmark 874 14005 1681159 33814 85 66.48 0.00 0.042 0.112
41 Domrep 435 2176 326887 6223 62 60.36 0.50 NA NA
42 Ecuador 470 2807 109118 15808 58 60.22 0.51 0.275 0.399
43 France 854 13897 1457515 37460 73 45.05 0.00 0.019 0.05
44 Greece 714 6815 538872 23738 64 54.94 0.09 0.041 0.042
45 Hungary 555 4983 552399 13501.606 66 67.19 NA NA NA
46 Iceland 625 13096 33185 26488 78® 66.91 NA NA NA
47 Italy 779 12604 2418872 33775 70 39.98 0.00 0.021 0.069
48 Japan 859 14791 4855285 41286 77 19.27 0.00 0.02 0.058
49 Mexico 495 6033 259870 13697 74 31.79 0.21 0.082 0.064
50 Morocco 435 2188 80622 1832 47 52.00 0.05 0.301 0.307
51 Norway 913 15156 168008 47118 76 80.31 0.00 0.014 0.041
52 Nzealand 834 11310 143521 35359 84 57.52 0.00 0.176 NA
53 Poland 610 3786 464537 11811 63 42.16 NA NA NA
54 Portugal 744 7843 840498 14117 35 75.95 0.08 0.047 0.194
55 Senegal 430 1128 45156 1560.1702 41 55.05 0.02 0.189 0.049
56 Spain 769 9718 752460 30888 79 37.68 0.00 0.042 0.123
57 Sweden 953 14370 277140 41017 84 55.94 0.00 0.033 0.028
58 Turkey 425 3738 280758 7626 64 42.87 0.13 0.133 0.872
59 UK 908 12920 3061794 22509 89 49.58 0.00 0.018 0.044
60 Uruguay 490 4851 86165 7278.9138 89 44.15 0.02 0.207 0.03
61 USA 973 17864 471247 35993 76 21.65 0.00 0.02 0.123
62 Venezuela 485 6586 146220 18296 91 56.93 0.47 0.182 0.002
63 Zimbabwe 465 1197 31762 3411 30 66.90 0.94 0.229 0.867
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Table A2; Correlation matrix
G D PP C G D P P C S G D PP A G DPPAS KAPW URB SO C OP1 BM P80 TAR Q U O EMB PO PDEN
G D PPC 1.000.000 0.973897 0.577686 0.453065 0.935507 0.693188 -0.257567 0.033538 -0.263758 -0.543563 -0.374005 -0.407389 0.132703
G D PPC S 0 9 7 3 8 9 7 1.000.000 0 5 3 3 6 7 0 0.426654 0.916370 0.586318 -0.194413 0.004670 -0.215867 -0.508473 -0.334932 -0.309958 0.111858
G D PP A 0 5 7 7 6 8 6 0.533670 1.000.000 0.942906 0.538630 0.445857 -0.152762 0.189361 -0.152089 -0.295632 -0.158022 -0.237239 0.662228
G DPPAS 0 453065 0.426654 0 9 4 2 9 0 6 1.000.000 0.417421 0.394040 -0.097736 0.213029 -0.108022 -0.246297 -0.135371 -0.155642 0.577276
KAPW 0.935507 0.916370 0 538630 0.417421 1,000.000 0.623927 -0.228611 0.068633 -0.245513 -0.518515 -0.319009 -0.381778 0.109042
UR B 0 693188 0.586318 0.445857 0.394040 0.623927 1,000.000 -0.352883 0.029085 -0.253320 -0.424251 -0.386705 -0.446062 0.002752
SO C -0 257567 -0.194413 -0.152762 -0.097736 -0.228611 -0.352883 1.000.000 0.067906 0.071483 -0.000415 0.163668 0.144061 -0.142839
OP1 0.033538 0.004670 0.189361 0.213029 0.068633 0.029085 0.067906 1,000.000 -0.088101 -0.273273 -0.166726 0.020579 0.025454
BM P80 -0.263758 -0.215867 -0.152089 -0.108022 -0.245513 -0.253320 0.071483 -0.088101 1,000,000 0.143470 0.052146 0.480398 -0.063625
TAR -0 543563 -0.508473 -0.295632 -0.246297 -0.518515 -0.424251 -0.000415 -0.273273 0.143470 1,000,000 0.452589 0.082752 0.135863
Q UO -0.374005 -0.334932 -0.158022 -0.135371 -0.319009 -0.386705 0.163668 -0.166726 0.052146 0.452589 1,000,000 0.005188 0.154673
EMB -0 407389 -0.309958 -0.237239 -0.155642 -0.381778 -0.446062 0.144061 0.020579 0.480398 0.082752 0 0 0 5 1 8 8 1.000,000 -0.177808
PO PDEN 0 1 3 2 7 0 3 0 1 1 1 8 5 8 0.662228 0.577276 0.109042 0.002752 -0.142839 0.025454 -0.063625 0.135863 0.154673 -0.177808 1,000,000
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Table A3: PRCA values (xIOOO)
Iron and Steel Non-ferrous metals 'Cement
1 SWITZERLAND 85 14 0
2 FINLAND 1269 224 0
3 GERMANY -282 -119 0
4 NETHERLANDS 100 -230 0
5 IRELAND 80 -176 0
6 KOREA -222 44 -5241.39
7 TRINIDAD 2529 0 3448.251
8 BRAZIL 2724 2120 988.2617
9 SAFRICA 482 -558 0
10 BULGARIA N.A. N.A. N.A.
11 JAMAICA -156 0 0
12 TUNISIA 382 -197 7281.305
13 THAILAND 81 -2913 0
14 JORDAN 37 0 5898.341
15 PARAGUAY 438 618 0
16 PAPUANG 0 315 0
17 PHILIPPINES -28 620 -2051.38
18 EGYPT 1505 1269 0
19 ZAMBIA 0 N.A. N.A.
20 GHANA 0 -15348 0
21 PAKISTAN -120 0 -10019.9
22 CHINA 445 54 -488.616
23 KENYA 330 0 -11362.1
24 INDIA 719 483 2485.175
25 NIGERIA 0 0 0
26 BANGLADESH 0 0 0
27 MALAWI -55 0 0
28 BHUTAN N.A. N.A. N.A.
29 ETHIOPIA 0 0 0
30 TANZANIA N.A. N.A. N.A.
31 MOZAMBIQUE 0 N.A. N.A.
32 Argentina 571 -76 0
33 Australia 184 372 0
34 Austria -606 -23 0
35 Belgium 75 -640 94.55659
36 Canada -22 -51 0
37 Chile -23 -11867 0
38 Colombia 697 44 -1634.36
39 Czech 2828 0 0
40 Denmark 100 -154 0
41 Domrep 10211 0 -2515.74
42 Ecuador 0 0 0
43 France -286 -144 0
44 Greece 397 112 -8768.56
45 Hungary 245 227 0
46 Iceland -107 -903 0
47 Italy -251 5 960.0026
48 Japan -1648 -106 -1409.33
49 Mexico 724 1176 478.6568
50 Morocco 10 -462 0
51 Norway 122 -103 0
52 Nzealand 448 -87 0
53 Poland 1707 1591 3748.412
54 Portugal -8 -76 1827.547
55 Senegal 0 0 0
56 Spain -920 -498 -7454.76
57 Sweden 255 -286 0
58 Turkey 1782 154 -9881.55
59 UK 375 -4301 0
60 Uruguay 27 570t  470.8776
61 USA 38 -29' 0
62 Venezuela 985. 12381 1348.82
63 Zimbabwe 40401 -1214 1573.768
47
